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 Chapter 7 
 The Ethnic Question: Census Politics 
in Great Britain 
 Debra  Thompson 
7.1  Introduction 
 In her analysis of a global data set compiled by the United Nations Statistical 
Division to survey the approaches to ethnic enumeration, Ann Morning ( 2008 ) fi nds 
that of the 141 countries under study, 63 % incorporate some form of ethnic enu-
meration though question and answer schema vary along dimensions that suggest 
diverse conceptualisations of race/ethnicity/indigeneity/nationality. Given the sub-
stantial number of countries that enumerate identity, it is no surprise that the aca-
demic scholarship envisions the census in a variety of ways. One of the fi rst 
analytical treatments of the census appeared in Benedict Anderson’s seminal work 
on nationalism,  Imagined Communities . The census, Anderson argues, is one of the 
three institutions (alongside maps and museums) that states use to create a common 
imagination for its subjects (Anderson  1991 : 163–164). James Scott’s understand-
ing of the census is similar – it is part of the state’s ongoing ‘project of legibility’ in 
which instruments of statecraft such as the census, the map, surnames, the centrali-
sation of traffi c patterns, the creation of offi cial languages, and even scientifi c for-
estry are used to create both a geographical terrain and population with standardised 
characteristics that will be most effi ciently monitored, counted, assessed and man-
aged (Scott  1998 : 81–82). Statistics are indeed the science of the state, as Foucault 
points out in his essay on governmentality. The production of statistics leads to the 
‘emergence of population,’ an outcome that relies on the will of the population to 
itself be managed (Foucault  1991 ). 
 However, the most common interpretation by policymakers and political elites is 
to think of the census as an instrument of  governance rather than a potentially insid-
ious instrument of statecraft. The data produced by the census are a crucial source 
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of information that allows governments to make policies; the census is the neutral 
tool of demographers that provides a wealth of statistical data for various govern-
ment sectors, like health and education (Simon  2004 ; Potvin  2005 ; Aspinall  2000 , 
 2003 ). The three most dominant explanations claim census politics are driven by 
demography, civil rights legislation, social mobilisation, or some combination 
thereof. Offi cial government documents are most likely to give causal weight to 
demography and the need to make the census institutionally consistent with civil 
rights legislation. 1 In the United States, explanations of census politics also empha-
sise the causal role of social mobilisation. These accounts have been particularly 
dominant in explaining the adoption of a ‘mark one or more’ approach on the 2000 
census, which scholars claim can be attributed to the actions of a very vocal mixed-
race social movement that pushed Congress for the change to its classifi cation stan-
dards (Nobles  2000 ; Aspinall  2003 ; Williams  2006 ; DaCosta  2007 ). 
 These interpretations of both the nature of the census and drivers of census poli-
tics seem insuffi cient. Though the data on ethnicity and race produced from cen-
suses are indeed critical for the state to monitor the effectiveness of, for example, 
anti-discrimination policies, this is one among many other possible employments of 
the census as an instrument of government(ality). Kertzer and Arel ( 2002 ) argue 
that the census does not simply refl ect objective social reality, but rather plays a 
constitutive role in the construction of that reality. 2 In this instrumentality, the very 
idea of race – however constructed, constituted, or fabricated – is animated through 
the forum of the census and further solidifi ed in law and policy. The census is a 
contributing (though not a monopolising creational) factor in the proliferation of 
racial taxonomies. In turn, censuses help to constitute racial discourse, which itself 
helps to shape and explain policy outcomes (Nobles  2002 : 43). Using the American- 
led academic literature on the social construction of race, the census can also be 
conceptualised as a  racial project 3 (Omi and Winant  1994 ): governmental concep-
tions of the meaning of race are developed (Where do the dividing lines between 
1  For example, Canada, the US and the UK all have legislation in place that relies on statistical data 
produced from the census in order to monitor the extent of racial discrimination in employment, 
housing, and other areas of social life. In the United States, the relevant legislation is the  Civil 
Rights Act (1964) and the  Voting Rights Act (1965), compared with Great Britain’s  Race Relations 
Act (1976; 2000) and Canada’s  Employment Equity Act (1986; 1995). All three countries also use 
census data to fund a wide array of social programs. 
2  On the census as a causal factor that affects national identity, see Miller ( 2007 ). 
3  Omi and Winant ( 1994 ) contend that a racial project is ‘ simultaneously an interpretation, repre-
sentation or explanation of racial dynamics, and an effort to reorganize and redistribute resources 
along particular racial lines ’ ( 1994 : 56; emphasis in original). Racial projects link together social 
structures and experiences that are racially organised with the meaning of race in a particular dis-
cursive practice. For example, the politically organised racial projects of the New Right claim to 
hold colour-blind views but covertly manipulate racial threats and fears in order to achieve political 
power ( 1994 : 58). Another example is nationalist projects, which stress the extent to which racial 
identity is incompatible with the production of a homogenous nation and demand the separation of 
the two ( 1994 : 59). These exemplify macro-level, sometimes state-driven projects in which very 
particular discursive meanings of race are connected with ideas about or attempts to organise insti-
tutions, policies and other social structures in accordance with the discursive meanings. 
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races lie? Who should count as white/non-white? What racial labels are appropriate 
for which groups?) and connected with a means of organising society (Are racial 
classifi cations discrete or multiple? Which racial groups should have access to gov-
ernment programming?). The census categories themselves are less important than 
the fact of social differentiation (Brown  2009 : 15) and the role of the state in pro-
moting and reifying it. 
 The argument that approaches to racial enumeration employed in national cen-
suses are driven by singular causes such as demography, civil rights legislation or 
social mobilisation also misses important nuances of the dynamics of census poli-
tics and are unlikely to hold true across time and space. In their analysis of racial 
enumeration throughout the world, Rallu et al. ( 2004 ) identify four main govern-
ment approaches to racial enumeration. The fi rst,  counting to dominate , character-
ises the colonial situation and other cases such as the Soviet Union and early 
twentieth century North America, whereby censuses were politically important 
tools for collectively identifying racialized others. Second,  not counting in the name 
of national integration occurs when race or ethnicity is rejected either in the name 
of national integration, as is presently the case in many African countries, or in the 
name of the republican principle of national unity as occurs in Western Europe. The 
third approach,  counting or not counting in the name of multiculturalism, refers to 
Latin America’s tendency to valorise racial mixing through the distinct practices of 
either not counting by race, which emphasises racial hybridity beyond counting, or 
to count by race, which promotes harmonious race relations by measuring the coun-
try’s degree of whitening. Finally,  counting to justify positive action invokes the 
pluralist models of Canada, the United States and Great Britain, all of which view 
racial enumeration as a tool in the fi ght against discrimination (Rallu et al.  2004 : 
534–536). 
 This chapter explores the political development of the ethnic question 4 on the 
British census. It seeks to complicate these causal accounts, which have a tendency 
to over-simplify the complex political processes involved in the politics of racial 
4  This chapter’s use of the terminology of ‘race’ versus ‘ethnicity’ is a tricky business. It will most 
often refer to the question on the census as an “ethnic question,” because this is the terminology 
used on the census, in archival records, and by those in Britain. However, I am hesitant to use the 
language of ethnicity in my analysis. Like race, ethnicity is a social signifi er of identity, but it is 
also fundamentally different. Ethnicity, which can overlap and intersect with race, often describes 
a collectivity with common ancestry, a shared past, culture and language, and a sense of people-
hood or community (Cornell and Hartmann  2007 : 16–20). The importance of race or ethnicity in a 
given society is context-specifi c. However, the origins of race are in assignment and categorization, 
and while ethnicity can have similar beginnings it is more often associated with the assertions of 
group members (Cornell and Hartmann  2007 : 28). Race is not simply about skin colour and mor-
phological characteristics, but rather should be understood as the signifi er of a complex set of 
power relations: ‘power is almost invariably an aspect of race; it may or may not be an aspect of 
ethnicity’ (Cornell and Hartmann  2007 : 31). In conducting this research, it seems to me that the 
language of ethnicity by elites, policy-makers and academics is often used to disguise these power 
relations and I am wary of furthering this problematic tendency. My use of race is also not a dra-
matic departure from what the Offi ce of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) itself has noted: 
‘ the census ethnic categories are essentially racial ’ (OPCS  1996 : 40, emphasis added). 
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 enumeration, by devoting particular attention to the cumulative and compounded 
relationships among ideas, institutions and interests that permeate census politics in 
Great Britain. In doing so, I make two general arguments. First, the British state has 
changed its approach to counting race over time. Using Rallu et al.’s ( 2004 ) typology, 
I argue that the British state has transitioned from not counting in the name of mul-
ticulturalism in the 1981 census to counting to justify positive action after the intro-
duction of the ethnic question in 1991 and fi nally, counting in the name of 
multiculturalism with the modifi cations to the question in 2001. Secondly, my anal-
ysis of the political development of the ethnic question on the British census between 
1981 and 2001 will demonstrate that censuses are not simply refl ective of demo-
graphic reality or a consequence of social mobilisation or the state’s initiative to 
maintain consistency with its civil rights legislation, but rather are inherently con-
nected to debates over the nature of citizenship and belonging in a given country. 
These debates are partially informed by ideas about race, colour, ethnicity and dif-
ference, which are mitigated through the institutions of the state and are given 
administrative life and scientifi c legitimacy through the forum of the census. 
7.2  Not Counting in the Name of Multiculturalism: Census 
Politics in the 1970s and 1980s 
 The tradition of censuses 5 of the population in Great Britain dates back over 
200 years; however, census question on ethnic identity only appeared on the decen-
nial census in 1991. 6 This inclusion effectively aligns Great Britain more closely 
immigration-based countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand than with other Western European states, which do not have census ques-
tions on race or ethnicity (Coleman and Salt  1996 : 17–23). 
 Though Blacks and Asians have a long history in Britain (Fryer  1984 ; Ramdin 
 1999 ), the majority of the non-white population derives from the arrival of immi-
grants from the Commonwealth in the post-World War II era, when debates over 
5  Strictly speaking, there are currently three censuses in the UK – England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. Beginning in 2001 fi nal decision-making power on the questions to be included 
in the census was devolved to the legislatures of Scotland and Northern Ireland. Although the 
census content of these three endeavours is closely related, the specifi c wording of the question on 
ethnicity and even the timing of its introduction have been known to vary; for example, a question 
on ethnicity appeared for the fi rst time in Northern Ireland in 2001, 10 years after its introduction 
in other parts of Britain. This chapter focuses on the census in England and Wales because of the 
institutional prominence of OPCS and its path-breaking decisions on whether or not (and the 
extent to which) a question on ethnicity should be included. 
6  Between 1841 and 1961 (excluding 1941, in which Great Britain did not conduct a decennial 
census) the census included a question on nationality. In 1841 this question pertained only to per-
sons born in Scotland or Ireland, while the years between 1851 and 1891 contained a question as 
to whether or not the respondent was a British subject. A complete list of Census topics from 1801 
to 2001 can be found at  http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/pdfs/topics_1801_2001.pdf . 
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immigration became increasingly racialized in spite of the fact that the majority of 
immigrants to Britain during this time came from European countries and Ireland 
(Solomos  2003 ). The history of British immigration control has been documented 
more extensively elsewhere 7 ; for our purposes, however, the political responses to 
increased non-white immigration are of interest. Linking the seemingly contradic-
tory elements of state imposition of racially specifi c immigration controls and mea-
sures to prevent racial discrimination towards the non-white population already 
residing in Britain, the  Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 sought to end dis-
crimination based on race. As Labour MP Roy Hattersley famously stated, 
‘Integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is 
indefensible.’ 8 The concept of integration was wrought with an air of prevention; at 
the time it was believed that without political institutions to address the social prob-
lems of immigrants, Britain would soon be facing the prospect of US-style racial 
tension and violence (Solomos  2003 : 81). The tasks of the  Race Relations Acts of 
1965 and 1968 were therefore to set up special bodies to deal with problems faced 
by immigrants in relation to discrimination, social welfare and integration and to 
educate the population as a whole about race relations in an attempt to minimise the 
potential for racial confl ict. 
 Though the census was the most obvious vehicle to gather information on both 
the extent of racial discrimination and the effectiveness of the  Race Relations Acts 
of the 1960s, it was not considered feasible to ask a question on race or ethnic iden-
tity in preparation for the 1971 census. The assertion of Dale and Holdsworth ( 1997 ) 
that the General Register Offi ce (the predecessor of the Offi ce of Population 
Censuses and Surveys) was adamant that such a question be neither asked nor 
answered is not entirely correct. The decision to include a question on parents’ 
country of birth – rather than the previously asked question about the respondents’ 
‘country of origin’ or a direct question on race or ethnicity – reveals the internal 
politicking at work within the state apparatus. Bureaucrats discussed the possibility 
of including a question on ethnic origin in the census as early as 1966. 9 When plans 
for the 1971 census took more defi nite shape in 1967, the bureaucrats at the Ministry 
of Health suggested there should be a question on ethnic origin, but the Home Offi ce 
could not initially agree to support this proposal because of the ‘considerable politi-
cal implications’ of asking the question, even in the context of a test survey. 
However, the need for racial data was acknowledged by senior Home Offi ce bureau-
crat Jack Howard-Drake, who wrote in a memo that his initial concern surrounded 
‘the impossibility of defi ning immigrant or colour in precise terms,’ but that he was 
7  See, for example, Paul ( 1997 ); Spencer ( 1997 ); Joppke ( 1999 ); see also Hansen ( 1999 ) for a dif-
ferent view. Though the British government did not restrict immigration by legislative action until 
the  Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, a study by Carter et al. ( 1987 ) concluded that between 
1948 and 1962 the state was involved in a complex political and ideological racialisation of British 
immigration policy, in which covert and sometimes illegal administrative measures were imple-
mented by both Labour and Conservative Governments to discourage Black immigration. 
8  Hansard , House of Commons, Vol. 709, col. 378–85. 
9  PRO HO 376/175, Letter by J.T.A. Howard-Drake to Miss Hornsby, 14 November 1966. 
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‘now not so sure that this view is correct,’ noting that ‘[with] the emergence of the 
second generation it will become increasingly important for us to have as much 
statistical information as we can about the coloured minority in the United 
Kingdom’. 10 In early 1968 the matter was referred to the Statistical Policy Committee 
for Ministers to decide; therein, the majority of the Committee were clearly in 
favour of collecting information about racial origin and decided to make the sugges-
tion at the upcoming Home Affairs Committee meeting. 11 At this meeting the 
Minister of Health proposed that a question on ethnic origin be included on the 
census, but the Secretary of State recorded his concern about the ‘political diffi cul-
ties’ that would result, 12 and the decision to include a question on ‘parents’ country 
of origin’ rather than a direct question on race was decided at the Ministerial level 13 
though Cabinet acknowledged that using this proxy would not provide accurate 
information on ethnic origin. 14 
 This initial call for a direct question on ethnicity therefore originated with 
bureaucrats in line departments and central agencies, who had discussed the issue 
internally for 2 years before it was proposed to Ministers. At the ministerial level the 
proposal was met with hesitance and caution, as political considerations (that had 
indeed been acknowledged by bureaucrats) played a much larger role in the decision- 
making process. These ‘considerable political implications’ were many: fi rst, 
British bureaucrats and Ministers alike felt that it was impossible to defi ne race or 
colour in the precise terms required for a statistical exercise such as the census. 
Second, there was a clear concern that asking a direct question on race or colour 
would be perceived as offensive to both ‘coloured’ and white respondents. The pro-
posal to instead ask the country of origin of the respondent’s parents was more 
familiar, and thus less controversial, since the 1961 census asked for country of 
birth with the intention of identifying immigrants to the United Kingdom. The 1971 
question, designed to identify the children of these immigrants, was not the extreme 
break from tradition that a direct question on ethnicity represented. Third, the gov-
ernment could not ignore the political implications that arose from its own policies. 
The  Race Relations Act of 1968 was on the table during this decision-making pro-
cess and given the Labour government’s ‘acknowledged as accepted policy to 
10  PRO HO 376/175, Minute by J.T.A Howard-Drake 17 November 1967. 
11  PRO HO 376/175, letter from J.T.A Howard-Drake to Mr. Weiler, 19 January 1968. There were 
also substantial discussions at the meetings of the Select Committee on Race Relations and 
Immigration in 1968 and 1969, but these took place after the decision to not include a direct ques-
tion on ethnicity had already been made (PRO HO 376/123). 
12  PRO HO 376/175, Note on the Home Affairs Committee meeting, n.a., 6 February 1968. 
13  PRO HO 376/123, Memorandum on the Collection of Racial Statistics, Cabinet Committee on 
Immigration and Community Relations, 19 March 1969. 
14  PRO HO 376/124, Cabinet document dated 6 February 1968. The original wording of the ques-
tion on parents’ country of origin stated: ‘Was your father/mother of African, Asian or West Indian 
origin? If “yes” state the country (for example, Pakistan, Nigeria, Jamaica, etc.).’ This was later 
changed to a more generic question about parents’ country of origin because this original version 
was too explicit in its focus on the non-white population (PRO HO 376/175, Paper to Statistical 
Policy Committee, January 1968). 
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 promote the integration of the immigrant population,’ a memo to the Prime Minister 
on the issue stated that it was ‘undeniably important that the Departments concerned 
should have particulars of [the immigrant population’s] numbers, whereabouts, 
employment, housing circumstances, education and so forth’. 15 The memo also 
notes that a failure to collect this information, or, as it was put at the time, to ‘take 
the opportunity of obtaining it,’ would open the government to criticism about the 
seriousness of their commitment to ending racial discrimination in Great Britain. 16 
 Finally, and likely most relevant, were the implications of the politics of num-
bers, which became a salient issue in Britain for a variety of reasons. In a time of 
restrictionist immigration policy, anti-immigration agitators laid claim that the 
actual size of the Black population in Britain was considerably larger than offi cial 
estimates (Bulmer  1986 : 472). For example, in 1964 the Conservative MP Peter 
Griffi ths ran in the general election in the constituency of Smethwick under the 
infamous anti-immigration slogan, ‘If you want a nigger for a neighbour, vote 
Liberal or Labour’ – and won. Four years later, coinciding with the decision to avoid 
a direct question on race in the 1971 census, Enoch Powell made his famous ‘Rivers 
of Blood’ speech to the West Midlands Conservative Political Centre in Birmingham. 
Any statistics concerning the actual size of the non-white population Britain could 
serve multiple politically instrumental purposes: on the one hand, the forthcoming 
census data could be used to, as bureaucrats hoped, establish the true facts and ‘dis-
prove wild estimates of the future coloured population’ 17 ; on the other hand, 
Conservatives sought the same facts to call for more restrictive immigration poli-
cies. The seminal study of race in Britain of this time,  Colour and Citizenship , noted 
that fears of being ‘swamped’ by the incoming ‘fl ood’ of immigrants was a key 
element to the formation of racist attitudes and that these fears were largely derived 
from exaggerated notions about the size of the coloured population, which, the 
study notes, were compounded by the absence of reliable statistics on the subject 
(Rose et al.  1969 : 551–605). The connection between immigration and race rela-
tions was as much numerical as political – would the natural increase of the second 
and third generations of non-white Britons make immigration restrictions less 
salient, or would it give further reason to restrict the fl ow? 
 These political considerations inhibited the government’s willingness to directly 
enumerate race; as such, the 1971 census collected information on both the respon-
dent’s country of birth (as in the 1961 census) and his or her parent’s country of 
birth in order to gauge the approximate size of the racial population. It was acknowl-
edged at the time – and indeed, throughout the policy-making process – that this 
method would be inaccurate for enumerating those white Britons who happened to 
be born in colonies overseas, pockets of the historic (and indigenous) Black British 
population, in, for example, Cardiff and Liverpool and people of mixed-race. There 
were also concerns regarding the extent to which mixed-race people should be 
15  PRO PREM 13/2703, Memo to Prime Minister, subsection Country of origin of the respondent’s 
parents, 5 February 1968. 
16  Ibid . 
17  PRO HO 376/175, memo by Miss M. Hornsby, 11 November 1966. 
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‘counted’ as part of the New Commonwealth immigrant population. 18 Generated 
indirectly using country of birth, parents’ country of birth, nationality and surnames, 
the subsequent census data was fl awed and proved inaccurate (Sillitoe and White 
 1992 : 142; Ballard  1996 : 10), but nevertheless estimated that 36.5 % of the non- 
white British population was born in the UK (OPCS  1975 ). 
 Thus, in spite of over a decade of legislation on racial integration in the UK, the 
state did not address the need for explicit racial census data until the mid-1970s. 
Though the proposal was still controversial at the time, there was a growing number 
of public bodies that advocated for the collection of racial statistics, including the 
Race Relations Board ( 1975 : 9), the Community Relations Commission ( 1975 : 10), 
and the Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (HM 
Government  1975 : 20–22). 19 A series of fi eld trials between 1975 and 1979 were 
instigated by the Offi ce of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS) 20 in order to 
develop a direct question on race/ethnicity that would be both acceptable to the 
public and would generate more reliable and accurate than the indirect question in 
1971. In general, however, there were two main diffi culties recorded by OPCS 
bureaucrat Ken Sillitoe ( 1978a ,  b ,  c ). First, the classifi cation of mixed-race respon-
dents presented a problem to the question designers, with twenty percent having 
provided ‘ambiguous’ answers and fi fteen percent providing ‘no answer’ during 
fi eld trials in 1975, likely because respondents were unclear which box to check 
(Sillitoe  1978a : 15). The second diffi culty was that West Indians were suspicious of 
the motives behind the data collection; response rates were generally low and this 
group was among the most likely to object to the ethnicity question on principle. 
However, Sillitoe notes that the hostility could be avoided if they were able to design 
some form of category ‘to record that although of non-UK descent he is neverthe-
less a U.K. citizen…because asking about ethnic origins only […] can be taken to 
imply that anyone who is not of U.K. origin continues to be in some sense different, 
or alien to our society, no matter how long he or his forebears have been in Britain’ 
(Sillitoe  1978a : 46). 
18  PRO HO 332/58, Report of the Working Party on Departmental Statistics for Commonwealth 
Immigrants, April 1970. On this issue, the report recommends: ‘We do not think that it is possible 
to recommend any hard and fast rule be followed. But it seems likely that we are moving to a stage 
when it will often at least be necessary to make available fi gures for children with one parent born 
in a new Commonwealth country at the same time as fi gures for those with both parents so born. 
In some instances however knowledge of the local situation might indicate whether children born 
to parents whose country of birth differs could properly be excluded from the “immigrant group”.’ 
It was eventually decided to include mixed-race persons as part of the New Commonwealth popu-
lation; a ‘statistical diffi culty’ resolved in this manner “partly due to the political climate and to Mr. 
[Enoch] Powell’s infl uence on the terms of the discussion” (PRO RG 26/436). 
19  However, as Erik Bleich points out, the continued tension surrounding the collection of racial 
data was epitomized by the Home Offi ce’s White Paper on race relations, which stated that ‘the 
Government considers that a vital ingredient of equal opportunities policy is a regular system of 
monitoring,’ but failed to recommend the collection of the racial data that would support these 
activities ( 2006 : 228). 




 The testing of an ethnic question did not guarantee its implementation on the 
1981 census. The 1978 report of the Select Committee on Race Relations and 
Immigration recommended including an ethnic question and Ministers with respon-
sibilities for social services felt that better information about ethnic minorities was 
required. However, some central agencies, including the Lord President of the 
(Privy) Council, Michael Foot, felt that the adoption of such a question would be 
‘ill-advised’ given the recent focusing of the public’s attention on immigration 
issues in the pre-election period. 21 Specifi cally, the Cabinet felt that ‘the category 
“white” in particular would be open to sensational and damaging treatment in the 
popular Press’. 22 However, the political considerations of the previous decade 
remained salient; Cabinet concluded that a reintroduction of the 1971 question on 
parents’ country of origin would not only be ineffective, but would also be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness, showing a lack of resolve to tackle the problems of 
racial disadvantage. The fi nal decision, summed up by Prime Minister James 
Callaghan, recognised the need for the racial data that could be provided by a direct 
question on the census, but noted that Cabinet ‘rejected the form of the question 
proposed for the census test, in particular the inclusion of the category “white”.’ 23 
 OPCS heeded the Cabinet order to fi nd alternative system of classifi cation 
couched exclusively in ethnic terms and in the Census Test in the London borough 
of Haringey in 1979 the ethnic designations ‘English, Welsh, Scottish or Irish’ were 
used as well as a further category, ‘Other European,’ alongside the ‘non-white’ 
ethno-national-geographical categories of ‘West Indian or Guyanese,’ ‘African,’ 
‘Indian,’ ‘Pakistani,’ ‘Bangladeshi,’ ‘Arab,’ ‘Chinese,’ and ‘Any other racial or eth-
nic group, or if of mixed racial or ethnic descent’. However, the results of this test 
were greatly affected by a campaign by local organisations and the media which 
urged people not to answer the question on race or ethnicity; 25,000 pamphlets were 
purportedly distributed to residents, linking these questions to the proposed nation-
ality laws that ‘would make nationality dependent on your parents’ nationality, not 
where you were born […] If we say now who is and who is not of British descent, 
we may one day asked to ‘go home’ if we were born here or not’ (cited in OPCS 
 1990 : 9). In this pre-election climate of 1979, the connection between race and 
immigration was explicit: the politics of numbers was (in)famously reinforced by 
the future Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who when asked about Tory policy on 
immigration in a January 1979 television interview for Granada  World in Action 
stated:
 Well, now, look, let us try and start with a few fi gures as far as we know them…if we went 
on as we are then by the end of the century there would be four million people of the new 
Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that people 
are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different 
culture and, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy for law and 
21  PRO CAB 128/63/14, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 13 April 1978. 
22  Ibid. 
23  Ibid. 
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done so much throughout the world that if there is any fear that it might be swamped people 
are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in. 24 
 The concern of racial minorities in Haringey was clearly related to these pro-
posed immigration controls and  Nationality Act , the latter of which was passed by 
Thatcher’s government in 1981 and was criticized for reinforcing discriminatory 
immigration policies: ‘Indeed, the category of British Overseas Citizen effectively 
deprived British citizens of (mostly) Asian origin of the right to live in Britain’ 
(Solomos  2003 : 65). Two years before this Act saw the light of day, campaigners 
believed that the reformed nationality law would jeopardise the status of racial 
minorities in Britain. The local campaign against the 1979 census test was therefore 
based on false but understandable concerns. Regardless, the number of people who 
objected in principle to the questions on ethnicity rose dramatically, with only 54 % 
of households returning their census test forms and as many as 32 % of both the 
West Indian and Asian respondents expressing views that they thought the inclusion 
of such a question was wrong. Even greater objections were expressed in regards to 
the parents’ country of birth question (OPCS  1980 ). After consultations with ethnic 
organisations following the Haringey affair, the government decided in November 
1979 to not include a question on ethnicity in the 1981 census. 
 Archival research reveals that Haringey was indeed an important factor that led 
to the exclusion of the ethnic question; however, other mitigating circumstances 
played important and often overlooked roles in the government decision-making 
process. The position that a potentially offensive ethnic question would jeopardise 
the entire census project was taken by the Registrar General (the head of OPCS); 
however, it is likely that the same line departments responsible for social services 
that had argued for racial data since the 1960s continued to do so. In post-Haringey 
consultations with the ethnic minority organisations and the public, opinion was 
split. Some powerful organisations, such as university departments, census users, 
and the Commission for Racial Equality, argued that an ethnic question was neces-
sary to monitor and combat racial disadvantage and that the incident in Haringey 
was largely caused by inadequate public relations (Commission for Racial Equality 
 1980 ). Others, including the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, 
the Haringey Community Relations Council and numerous ethnic organisations, 
vehemently opposed the inclusion of a question for a variety of reasons, ranging 
from the contention that the collection of racial data indicates that non-whites – 
rather than institutional racism – were the problem 25 to the ‘uncertainty of the 
Government’s intention on the nationality law.’ 26 In the end, the decision to present 
24  http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=103485 , site viewed 6 
June 2009. Note that the BBC transcript is slightly different that this, the Granada transcript, 
recording that Thatcher commented that people are afraid of being swamped by people  of a differ-
ent culture (emphasis added). 
25  PRO HO 376/223, Press Release – British Society for Social Responsibility in Science, 17 
October 1979. 




the government’s conclusion as a technical one was partially a matter of political 
spin. An internal memo to Home Secretary William Whitelaw and Minister of State 
Tim Raison noted that the use of the ‘technical’ justifi cation was the lesser of all 
evils:
 The least unsatisfactory course would seem to be to try to present the decision as essentially 
a technical one; namely, that the Haringey test has shown that the Census is not a way of 
getting this information and that the Government will employ other and more acceptable 
techniques. It will be particularly important, therefore, that any announcement of the deci-
sion should be framed in as positive a way as possible, both to emphasise the Government’s 
continuing commitment to obtaining information designed to be used for the benefi t of the 
ethnic minority communities and to indicate that positive steps are being taken to fi nd alter-
native sources of data. 27 
 Again, the government was aware that the exclusion of the ethnic question from 
the census would leave it open to criticism about its commitment to race relations. 
Accepting the Registrar General’s concern about the ethnic question’s potentially 
damaging effect to the census project as a whole was a convenient way to quash the 
initiative while minimising the damage to the new government’s credibility in the 
politics of race relations. Moreover, this justifi cation also permitted the government 
to mask the true weight that organised opposition had in determining the outcome 
of the Haringey test and the subsequent policy decision to drop the question, a rev-
elation which government offi cials believed ‘could be seriously damaging to race 
relations’. 28 It is also likely that the mobilising power and impact of ethnic organisa-
tions were deeply troubling to government offi cials – it was therefore necessary to 
belay any public insinuations that local organisations could so deeply sway the 
course of politics in Britain. 
 Another mitigating factor beyond the Haringey test that led to the exclusion of 
the ethnic question was the role of political climate and ideology. If Haringey had 
never happened, would the newly instated Conservative government have approved 
a direct question on race for the 1981 census? The evidence suggests that it is not 
likely. In a letter from Patrick Jenkin, the Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security, to Home Secretary William Whitelaw, Jenkin conveyed that in a meeting 
with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher she suggested that much of the information 
gained from the census was unnecessary because it duplicated data available else-
where. In a testament to the principles of neo-liberal thought, Thatcher was ‘very 
concerned about the intrusion into the private affairs of individuals and feels strongly 
that Government will lay itself open to justifi able criticism unless it can be shown 
that these questions are really necessary for policy analysis and decisions’. 29 Indeed, 
upon further inspection Thatcher found many of the questions (i.e., whether 
27  PRO HO 376/223, Memo from G.I. de Deney to Raison (Minister of State) and Whitelaw 
(Secretary of State), 2 November 1979. 
28  Id . 
29  PRO 376/223, Letter from Patrick Jenkin, Secretary of State for Social Services, to William 
Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Home Department, 13 December 1979. 
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 working, retired, housewife, etc.) to be ‘completely unnecessary’. 30 The state’s 
incursion into the private lives of individuals was a compelling neoconservative 
concern, complemented well in this circumstance by another tenet of the 
Conservative platform – cost-cutting. The introductory speech on the 1980 Census 
Order in the House of Lords ended with the proclamation that the census budget of 
£44 million was a 17.5 % decrease in the cost projected by the previous Labour 
administration’s White Paper. 31 To be clear, the decision to drop the ethnic question 
from the Census had been made in early November 1979, over a month before 
Thatcher culled other census questions from the fi nal product. However, as noted by 
government offi cials at the time, ‘[Thatcher’s] concern to avoid complexity and 
unnecessary intervention into privacy seems to be to have been likely to lead her to 
challenge the ethnic question on these grounds had the decision not already been 
taken to abandon them.’ 32 Haringey or not, the proposed ethnic question would not 
likely have resurfaced until the 1991 census, when its implementation was 
unavoidable. 
 In sum, a variety of ideational, institutional and interest-based factors combined 
to shape the approach to racial enumeration used by Britain during the 1970s and 
1980s, which can best be described as  not counting in the name of multiculturalism . 
According to Rallu et al.’s ( 2004 ) typology, this is a circumstance in which ‘racial 
mixing is acknowledged in political and ideological views as a positive value’ and 
therefore the countries do not enumerate according to race or colour. The thrust of 
this approach lies in the tendency to valorise racial mixing by not counting race, 
which emphasises racial hybridity beyond the necessity of counting, contrasted 
with those countries that count by race in the name of multiculturalism, which pro-
motes harmonious race relations by measuring the country’s degree of whitening. 
Though the original formulation of this approach refers to the unique cases of Latin 
America, I contend its very label – not counting in the name of multiculturalism – 
suggests circumstances when the state intentionally does not count by race in spite 
of a host of characteristics that imply it would or should. Given the empirical evi-
dence presented here, it is possible to identify a number of more specifi c idiosyncra-
sies that characterise the gradients of this approach. 
 First, states that do not enumerate by race in the name of multiculturalism have 
a legislative, political or symbolic commitment to multiculturalism, however 
defi ned. 33 Second, quite aside from this commitment to multiculturalism, there will 
also often be legislation that prohibits discriminatory state action and condemns 
30  Ibid . 
31  Hansard , House of Lords, vol. 408, 22 April 1980, col. 737. 
32  PRO HO 376/223, Letter from G.I. de Deney to Miss Maurice (Director of Statistics), re: 1981 
Census Ethnic Question, 12 December 1979. 
33  Multicultural regimes are defi ned differently in various national contexts, but ultimately speak to 
similar principles. For example, paradigms of multiculturalism, racial equality and racial integra-
tion are not the same, and yet all employ similar principles of non-assimilation and respect for 
racial and/or cultural difference, and are enshrined in other political or discursive attempts to create 
a national community based on these principles. 
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racial discrimination in housing, employment, and other areas of social life. This 
legislation, however ineffectively designed or implemented, has the goal of alleviat-
ing or eradicating racial disadvantage in social, political and economic life. Third, 
 in spite of both commitments to multiculturalism and legislation that may require 
racial statistics to be properly implemented or to create a more effective system of 
monitoring, there is still controversy or general discomfort around the very notion 
of race. In the upper echelons of government, this controversy or discomfort trans-
lates into the general idea that counting by race will negatively affect national and 
social cohesion. Fourth, the aversion of race and racialism is specifi c to counting by 
race and is not necessarily an opposition to colour-consciousness. In other areas of 
law and policy, colour-consciousness may feature predominately or may appear in 
other political commitments to racial equality. In short, states do not wholly or 
explicitly adhere to the republican principle of colour-blindness, and therefore not 
counting by race in the census is not because the state itself ignores race is all ave-
nues. 34 And fi nally, this refusal to count often occurs in spite of calls for the collec-
tion of racial data or an acknowledged need for racial statistics from within the state. 
7.3  Counting to Justify Positive Action: The 1991 Census 35 
 The state’s approach of not counting in the name of multiculturalism proved unsus-
tainable. The unavoidability of the direct question on race was partially due to the 
fact that disparate arms of state authority had begun to publically recognise the need 
for racial data. Vocal support for the question had unwaveringly been provided by 
the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE  1980 ) and this call for change was aug-
mented by several prominent governmental bodies. Calls for a direct question on 
ethnicity were made by the 1981 report of the Home Affairs Committee on Racial 
Disadvantage and Lord Scarman’s 1982 Report on the Brixton riots (Leech  1989 : 
9), but the most infl uential call for action was to come from the Sub-Committee on 
Race Relations and Immigration. The Sub-Committee began its enquiry into 
whether or not an ethnic or racial question should be asked on the national census in 
1982, inviting evidence from a variety of external stakeholders, including Local 
Authorities, other public bodies such as Health Authorities and ethnic minority 
organisations. Its members also travelled to Canada and the United States to famil-
iarise themselves with the collection of ethnic and racial data in other countries. In 
34  This is the crucial distinction between two approaches to racial enumeration: not counting in the 
name of multiculturalism and not counting in the name of national integration, the latter of which 
occurs when race or ethnicity is rejected in the name of national integration, as is presently the case 
in many African nations, or in the name of the republican principle of national unity as occurs in 
Western Europe. 
35  See Appendix  7.1 . 
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its parliamentary report issued in May 1983, the multi-party Sub-Committee 36 pub-
lically regretted the decision to not include a question on ethnicity in the 1981 cen-
sus. The report reviewed the need for information on ethnic groups in order to 
monitor the effectiveness of anti-discrimination policy and proposed that the OPCS 
carry out a further series of fi eld tests to develop an improved design of question on 
race and/or ethnicity for possible inclusion in the 1991 census. The report accepted 
that the racial terms ‘White’ and ‘Black’ would need to be employed and went so 
far as to suggest a design for the ethnic question. In its reply the following year, the 
government accepted many of these recommendations in principle, noting that fur-
ther tests needed to be carried out in order to create a reliable and publically accept-
able question for the 1991 census (HM Government  1984 ). Thus the decision to 
once again address the issue of race and the census was not exactly coming from 
within the depths of the state itself, but nor did the driver of change derive from a 
completely external force, such as interest groups, social mobilisation or an exoge-
nous shock. Though Scarman’s inquiry and the various committees of Parliament 
were arms of the state, the common thread amongst these disparate promoters of an 
ethnic question on the census was their simultaneous connection to and autonomy 
from the state, which allowed greater manoeuvrability in the interpretation of con-
tentious political issues. 
 The next series of fi eld tests, held between 1985 and 1989, demonstrated that the 
categories of ‘Black British’ and ‘British Asian’ were demanded by respondents but 
were nevertheless fraught with complexities, since some members of racial minori-
ties born in British colonies overseas considered themselves to be ‘British Asian,’ 
though the use of that label was intended to appeal to second-generation British- 
born Asians. When the fi eld trials explicitly tested the reliability of data that allowed 
everyone to classify themselves as British, the fi nding was that respondents found 
the format confusing and the data were compromised. When the question elimi-
nated the qualifi er ‘British’ from the racial category descriptors in subsequent fi eld 
trials, West Indians continued to express their wish for a Black British category or 
something similar. 
 The terms of the test were determined by government offi cials, with an internal 
working group created in 1985 to consider the design of the question. Consultations 
were part of the group’s terms of reference, but the stakeholders the working group 
was to consult throughout the design process were mainly internal, with the sole 
exception being the CRE, an organisation that was created and funded by the state 
but was also autonomous from it. The group appears to have understood the neces-
sity of consulting with ethnic minority organisations to prevent the disastrous 
Haringey results; however, the members were undecided on the crucial question of 
 when to consult. The group recognised that if ethnic minorities were consulted 
36  The Sub-Committee was chaired by the Conservative MP John Wheeler and was comprised of 
one other Conservative MP (John Hunt) and two Labour MPs (Alexander Lyon and Alf Dubs). 
Interestingly, the members’ dedication to their task transcended party lines; Leech ( 1989 ) writes 
that ‘the members of this committee were strongly committed to the question’ and were often 
hostile to those who expressed doubts (1989: 10). 
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before fi eld trials, there was a strong possibility they would object to the designs 
being tested, but if they were not consulted in advance, ‘there might be complaints 
that we are failing to take heed to the SCORRI [Sub-Committee on Race Relations 
and Immigration] emphasis on the need for better public relations/publicity’. 37 
There is little evidence that consultations with minority groups took place during 
the early fi eld trials; according to the OPCS and General Register Offi ce for Scotland 
(GRO(S)), the OPCS and CRE began a series of meetings with Community 
Relations Offi cers and representatives of ethnic minority organisations in England 
and Wales in late 1987 when a recommended question had already been decided. 
The purpose of the meetings was to discuss acceptability and ‘to try to fi nd out what 
doubts or fears, if any, people might have’ rather than a deliberative democratic 
policy-making process. 38 Consultation, in this sense, can be likened to a public rela-
tions campaign. 
 The shift in governmental approaches to racial enumeration from not counting in 
the name of multiculturalism to counting to justify positive action became clear 
with the 1998 Census White Paper, which linked the rectifi cation of economic dis-
advantage in minority populations with the promotion of positive race relations and 
the general welfare of the public. It also stated that the information collected on 
housing, employment, educational qualifi cations and age-structure of each group 
would help the government carry out its responsibilities under the 1976  Race 
Relations Act and serve as benchmarks to monitor the implementation of equal 
opportunities policies (HM Government  1988 ). The proposed question read: ‘Please 
tick the appropriate box. If the person is descended from more than one group, 
please tick the one to which the person considers he or she belongs, or tick box 7 
and describe the person’s ancestry in the space provided.’ The categories included 
(numbered 1–7) were: White; Black; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese; Any 
other ethnic group (and a mark-in space). 
 At this stage, the government invited further comment from members of the pub-
lic and from ethnic/racial organisations on whether they would answer the question. 
Comments from Black groups continued to request more detail on the ethnic origins 
of Black people in Britain (Sillitoe and White  1992 : 155). It was eventually decided, 
therefore, that the question on the census test of April 1989 should incorporate the 
following categories (numbered 1–9): White; Black-Caribbean; Black-African; 
Black-Other (and a mark-in space); Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Chinese; Any 
other ethnic group (and a mark-in space). Using this question design, less than one 
half of one percent of respondents declined to cooperate because of the question and 
the proportion of Black respondents who objected to the question in the 1989 census 
test was 19 % – close to the lowest level of objection recorded amongst Black infor-
mants since 1979 (White and Pearce  1993 : 295). 
37  PRO RG 40/397, 1991 Census: Ethnic Question Project Group – terms of reference, 7 January 
1985. 
38  OPCS and GRO(S), ‘Major steps towards the 1991 Census,’  1981…1991 Census Newsletter , no. 
4. 17 December  1987 . 
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 The inaugural inclusion of a direct question on ethnicity in the 1991 census was 
heralded as a resounding success (Coleman and Salt  1996 ). It also represents a clear 
break from Britain’s previous approach of not counting in the name of multicultur-
alism to counting, changing to one of counting to justify positive action. The need 
to comply with the spirit and intent of the  Race Relations Act was given as the  de 
facto justifi cation for the collection of racial data. At an international conference in 
1992 with representatives from Canadian, American, and British census offi ces, 
British civil servants from OPCS noted that ethnic data on the census was collected 
because of the need for reliable information about unemployment levels, pay equity, 
housing conditions, and educational attainment of Blacks and Asians in Britain and 
also ‘because of the need to know the extent to which equal opportunity programs 
are succeeding in reducing the inequalities resulting from discriminatory practices’ 
(White and Pearce  1993 : 271). This rationale was also repeated in the White Papers 
of 1988 and 1999. Note, however, that the legislation itself was consistent through 
the employment of either approach to racial enumeration. Though census data have 
clearly been used to provide evidence of racial discrimination and to monitor the 
effectiveness of government programs (Coombes and Hubbuck  1992 ; Stavo- 
Debauge and Scott  2004 ; Stavo-Debauge  2005 ) this argument is far more of a spuri-
ous justifi cation after the fact rather than being a singular cause of the racialization 
in British statistics. Instead, the British case suggests that: (1) unless provisions for 
ethnic monitoring are expressly stated in legislation, an institutional mandate does 
not necessarily lead to the implementation of a direct census question on race; and 
(2) the content of civil rights legislation matters a great deal. If simply the existence 
of civil rights legislation – or even an acceptance of the legal concept of indirect 
discrimination – mattered, then Britain would have seen the emergence of an ethnic 
question far sooner than it did. Civil rights legislation is likely a necessary but insuf-
fi cient cause for the collection of racial data. 
7.4  Counting in the Name of Multiculturalism: The 2001 
Census 39 
 In preparation for the 2001 census the British government sought to institutionalise 
a consultative process that incorporated input from census data users at an earlier 
stage in the policy-making process. Though internal working groups comprised of 
representatives from different departments and levels of government are the norm 
for many areas of policy making, it was in the mid-1990s that the OPCS decided to 
‘build on the experience in 1991 by involving users in an active role for planning the 
2001 Census’ (OPCS and GRO(S)  1995a ). This active consultation was to occur 
through six advisory groups representing the main users of census data. 40 Members 
39  See Appendix  7.2 . 
40  These groups represented interests from: (1) the health sector (Health Service Advisory Group); 
(2) Local Authorities (Information Development and Liaison Group); (3) academia (Demographic 
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from each of these groups were represented on the subsequent Working Group on 
Content, Question Testing and Classifi cation and subgroups were formed to discuss 
particular questions for consideration on the 2001 census (OPCS and GRO(S) 
 1995b ). The ethnic question, along with other questions concerning income and 
benefi ts, language, disability, careers, relationship within household, migration, 
labour market, qualifi cations and housing, were identifi ed as high priority for test-
ing (OPCS and GRO(S)  1995c ). A subgroup on the ethnicity question was then 
tasked in April 1995 with determining what changes should be made to the 1991 
format, to be presented in a business case to the newly renamed Offi ce for National 
Statistics (ONS). The core membership of the ethnic question subgroup was com-
prised of members from all fi ve of the main Advisory Groups, but the working 
group itself was not large. 
 Three modifi cations made to the 1991 census design are of particular interest and 
speak to Britain’s shift from solely counting to justify positive action to also count-
ing in the name of multiculturalism. First, the 2001 census disaggregated the ‘white’ 
category and provided the options of ‘British,’ ‘Irish,’ and ‘Any other White back-
ground’ with a write-in space. These options stem from the efforts of a surprisingly 
vocal lobby that persuaded members of the Working Group and ONS to add an Irish 
category. Unlike the US, lobbies are fairly unusual in the British context – the 
Westminster system of government and relatively closed policy networks make it 
far more diffi cult for interest groups to access decision-makers (Marsh and Rhodes 
 1992 ). However, the Irish lobby used the notion of disadvantage to make their case 
(Aspinall  1996 ) in multiple institutional access points, targeting both the Working 
Group and the state and fi nding a particularly powerful ally in the Department of 
Health. 41 This was a necessary step; as one ONS representative noted, lobby pres-
sure from other white ethnic groups, such as the Cypriots, the Greek Cypriots, the 
Cornish and the Welsh were not persuasive because they could not demonstrate 
their groups had experienced disadvantages in health, education and the like. 42 
When the Working Group recommended the inclusion of an Irish category on the 
2001 census, the ONS has hesitant: ‘ONS was reluctant to have it at all…maybe 
because it wasn’t driven by colour. ONS didn’t really have a strong appreciation of 
the nature and scale of the disadvantage. Although evidence was beginning to be 
published then […] The Irish group was a tougher sell – it was about 1997 when 
they came around. There was quite a lot of resistance.’ 43 Though the lobby eventu-
ally achieved their goal, ONS’s unease with counting Irish was partially because the 
Liaison Group); (4) central government (Departmental Working Group); (5) the private sector 
(Business Advisory Group); and (6) devolved territories (Scottish Statistical Liaison Group) 
(OPCS and GRO(S)  1995a ). 
41  Interview with ONS representative, April 2009. 
42  In her words: ‘So, in the Irish case, you could argue that there have been discrimination, and if 
you wanted to overcome that discrimination – one of the key drivers behind this question, that 
resource allocation needed to be redirected to the improvement of housing or education or health. 
I don’t think the Greek Cypriots could produce such a convincing case that they were suffering 
discrimination.’ Interview with ONS representative, April 2009. 
43  Interview with Working Group member, April 2009. 
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category did not align well with the state’s conceptualisation of what  racial disad-
vantage is, and therefore, what the ethnic question was designed to measure. 
 The second major discussion that led to a modifi cation of the 1991 census design 
concerned the enumeration of mixed-race people. Results from the 1991 census seemed 
to contradict the assertions espoused by OPCS, that ‘people of mixed descent often 
preferred not to be distinguished as a separate group,’ (Sillitoe and White  1992 : 149) 
since approximately one in four members of minority ethnic groups wrote in descrip-
tions in the available free-text fi elds, and of the 740,000 persons who gave a description 
nearly one-third, or 240,000 people, wrote in mixed- origins descriptions (Aspinall 
 2003 : 278). These numbers are particularly signifi cant as they outnumbered the popu-
lation for three groups counted separately on the 1991 census (Chinese, Bangladeshi 
and Black-African). While some respondents identifi ed with one of the main groups, 
comparing the count of those mixed-race persons with individuals checking the ‘mixed’ 
box in the Labour Force Survey 44 suggests that around two-thirds of the mixed-race 
population chose to write in a description rather than select one of the designated cat-
egories (Aspinall  2003 : 278). The need to fi nd more accurate methods to collect mean-
ingful data on mixed-race people, who were considered a growing population, was 
generally acknowledged (Bulmer  1996 ; Owen  1996 ; Aspinall  2000 ). 
 In stark contrast to the United States, there was near unanimous support for the 
proposal to enumerate mixed-race on the 2001 census from government depart-
ments, the CRE, and within the ethnic question subgroup and the Content, Question 
Testing and Classifi cation Working Group. Aspinall’s ( 1996 ) report on the ethnic 
subgroup consultation makes the case for inclusion based on demand from within 
the group, 45 the increasing size of the group, and the need for analytical clarity, 
particularly when the data is being used for service provision. The ONS immedi-
ately accepted the subgroup’s business case and recommendation to count mixed- 
race. With the substantive question of whether or not to include some provision to 
classify the multiracial population largely decided, the subgroup discussions 
focussed on more semantic issues, such as whether the label should read ‘mixed- 
race’ when the question itself referred to ethnicity, 46 the order of labels within the 
category (i.e., whether the category should read ‘White and Black Caribbean’ or 
‘Black Caribbean and White’), the placement of the larger mixed category within 
the ethnic question, 47 and the use of the generic label of ‘Asian’ when the Black 
44  Ethnicity data in Great Britain are also available from two other surveys: the Labour Force 
Survey and the General Household Survey. However, both these surveys are too small to give 
estimates at a local level, nor is their coverage as encompassing as in the census (Bhrolcháin  1990 : 
556). It is also interesting to note that the collection of ethnic data was introduced in these surveys 
in the early 1980s without any public or political debate. 
45  Of the three arguments, ‘demand from within the group’ is clearly the weakest. Aspinall’s ( 1996 ) 
report relies heavily on evidence from the United States, where multiracial organisations were lob-
bying the federal government for classifi catory changes to the 2000 census. Aspinall notes that the 
evidence of a similar consciousness or demand in Britain was ‘piecemeal’. 
46  Note that the label in the 2001 census simply reads ‘Mixed’ with no further qualifi er. 
47  The category was eventually placed second, after ‘White,’ to ensure that respondents did not 
overlook the category (Moss  1999 ), though some argue that this position is also an effort to avoid 
the historical stigma of the ‘half-caste’ (Kosmin  1999 ). 
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subgroups were divided into Black-Caribbean and Black-African (Caballero  2004 : 
121). A multiple response approach to enumerating mixed-race – as is used in both 
the Canadian and American censuses – was never seriously considered. One ONS 
representative suggested this was because multi-ticking represented ‘a failure of the 
question’ – respondents tick more than one box when they are confused or when 
instructions are unclear. 48 A member of the ethnicity question subgroup noted that 
when a two-tier question on ethnic ancestry and ethnic group that required multi- 
ticking was tested, ‘people were very confused by multi-ticking’. 49 A multiple- 
response approach to the mixed-race question, however, was never proposed or 
tested and it was ultimately the ONS that designed the 2001 mixed-race census 
categories: White and Black-Caribbean, White and Black-African, White and Asian 
and a free-text ‘any other mixed background’. 50 The inclusion of mixed-race catego-
ries in the 2001 census simply was not a contentious issue. This state of affairs is 
very different from previous policy discussions, which designated the enumeration 
of multiracial people as a ‘problem’. In contrast, the only concerns recorded in this 
instance were by census users who were apprehensive about the effects on the qual-
ity and comparability of the ethnic group data brought about by the inclusion of a 
mixed-race category. 
 The third modifi cation is the addition of the headings ‘Black or Black British’ 
and ‘Asian or Asian British’ in the ethnic question. The demand for a ‘Black British’ 
category dates back to the early fi eld trials of the 1970s and its continued presence 
in British census politics over the decades speaks to the discursive connections 
between race and citizenship. As Ballard ( 1996 ) notes, unlike the white majority 
this population had no objection to a public testament that Britain had become a 
diverse society, but ‘what they did fi nd deeply offensive – understandably enough – 
was any indication that their distinctiveness might be read as an indication that they 
were in some sense non-British’ (Ballard  1996 : 12). This sensitivity to the race/citi-
zenship nexus had been used well in the 1984 election, when the Tories, vying to 
increase their appeal to the Black electorate, released a campaign poster which fea-
tured a well-dressed black professional under the words ‘Labour says he is black. 
Tories say he is British,’ (Gilroy  1987 ) implying, of course, that one cannot possibly 
be both Black and British simultaneously. However, as the 1980s and 1990s wore 
on, Great Britain experienced a more prominent disconnect between discourses of 
race relations and immigration than ever before, as second and third generation 
Blacks and Asians lay claim to being just as British as anyone else. In previous 
decades, blackness was perceived by the majority population as being synonymous 
with ‘immigrant’ (Gilroy  1987 : 46; Ballard  1997 ) but the growth of a politically 
48  Interview with ONS representative, 15 April 2009. 
49  Interview with member of ethnic question subgroup, 6 April 2009. 
50  Interviews with members of ethnic question subgroup, 20 April 2009 and 22 April 2009. Note the 
specifi c concern with individuals of white/non-white racial backgrounds. According to ONS rep-
resentatives, the number of non-white mixes (i.e., Black-African and Asian) simply did not warrant 
specifi c categories; however, one cannot help but notice the continued lack of consideration of 
mixes that do not involve the white majority. On this topic, see Mahtani and Moreno ( 2001 ). 
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active generation of British born and bred racial minorities not willing to settle for 
anything but full citizenship (complete with a sense of belonging as part of the 
nation) helped to challenge the unspoken, but dominant, paradigm that Britishness 
was equated with whiteness. 51 
 The policy proposal to include the ‘Black British’ and ‘Asian British’ as head-
ings rather than categories in the 2001 census came from ONS. Working group 
members had struggled with the issue of retaining high-quality and comparable data 
that detailed ancestry while allowing respondents to identify as British, since there 
was still such demand from the public. On this topic, one working group member 
commented:
 I’ve got to give credit to the ONS – I couldn’t sort out in my head, retaining the data about 
Black-African or Black-Caribbean ancestry and having Black British as a tick box. Because 
we knew young people born in Britain, brought up in Britain, identifi ed as Black British, 
they weren’t fussed about ancestry from the Caribbean. Even their parents might have been 
born in Britain. And, you know, they just felt British. So why not give them a tick box so 
they can say what they are? And that appealed to a lot of us in the working group…but ONS 
wanted to know whether in ancestry terms whether people were from the Caribbean or 
Africa […] ONS came up with this inspired solution of putting Black British and Asian 
British in the group label. Ok, you lost the facility to tick Black British as a tick box, but 
you got reference to national origins. I just thought that was inspired. 52 
 The inclusion of some way of recognising Black British or Asian British identi-
ties ‘had been a sticking point for a long time’. This solution, which acknowledges 
both race and British nationality and/or citizenship, suggests a symbolic function of 
the census beyond the task of counting the population. The more intangible ele-
ments of census politics, where the census collides with ideas of citizenship and 
belonging, demand that policy-makers negotiate between technical requirements 
and the politics of recognition (Taylor  1994 ). 
 In sum, these modifi cations illuminate important changes that had occurred 
between 1991 and 2001, refl ected and reinforced through the census. For example, 
though it is diffi cult to measure or defi ne in the social scientifi c sense, a consistent 
feature in interviews with government offi cials and participants in census consulta-
tions was the contention that in the late 1980s and early 1990s ‘things had changed’. 
As one interviewee put it:
 I think it’s a change in society as well. It’s a change that’s refl ected in the change in govern-
ment. In this government we have now all these protections for different groups; very pow-
erful legislation protecting against discrimination. I think there’s much stronger movement 
to recognise diversity in different societies. There’s been a form of identity politics if you 
like. Britain has been a bit slower than the United States and Canada. I think now there’s 
just so much interest in ethnicity and race in this country; communities are organising 
 themselves a lot more effectively, being involved in consultations and participation and all 
sorts of government bodies. I think these two things are entrapped with each other. Identity 
politics and these new legal protections. 53 
51  See Parekh ( 2000 ). 
52  Interview with Working Group member, April 2009. 
53  Interview with ethnicity question subgroup member, 6 April 2009. 
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 To be clear, the impetus of enumerating by race in order to meet legislative 
requirements set out in the  Race Relations Act was still an important factor that 
contributed to the initial and subsequent appearances of the ethnic question. 
However, as the comment above suggests, there was an equally important acknowl-
edgement and recognition of Britain’s diversity that by 2001 occurred both through 
and within the census. 
 The ethnic question in the 2001 census exemplifi es some tenets of the govern-
mental approach of counting in the name of multiculturalism. The use of this 
approach is clearly connected to the census designers’ efforts to develop a question 
that would be publicly acceptable and would garner high response rates and high 
quality data, but there are also symbolic or discursive issues at play in the determi-
nation of census categories and classifi cations. Policy-makers were very concerned 
with providing options that allowed respondents to identify as what they ‘really are’ 
and were willing to adjust census categories (that had previously been successful at 
attaining high quality data) in order to accommodate these issues of identity and 
recognition. Also, discourses of race, citizenship and belonging are linked together 
through the census; the census has become an instrument of diversity governance, 
used by the state to promote multiculturalism and national diversity as a positive 
value. This use of the census is particularly potent when combined with the approach 
of counting to justify positive action, sending signals within the state and to the 
public-at-large that equality and diversity are important state priorities. 
7.5  Conclusion 
 This chapter has detailed the British government’s shift in the racialization of statis-
tics, from not counting in the name of multiculturalism in the 1970s and 1980s, to 
counting to justify positive action in 1991 and also to counting in the name of mul-
ticulturalism in 2001. Rather than being driven by singular causes such as social 
mobilisation, the drive for institutional consistency with civil rights legislation or 
demography, census categories and classifi cations are the result of the complicated 
interplay of ideational and institutional factors. 
 Institutions clearly matter. The nature of the census is such that there is an insti-
tutional imperative to present publicly acceptable questions and policy success is 
measured by high response rates and the quality of data acquired. Other institutions 
have mattered in more subtle ways: Britain’s unitary system of government and 
experiments with devolution have allowed local authorities a seat at the policy- 
making table, while its parliamentary system of government ensures that policy 
agendas are kept secret and decisions are elite- or bureaucracy-driven. Opportunities 
for interest groups to access decision-makers are limited and lobby efforts are sty-
mied by party discipline (Marsh and Rhodes  1992 ; Smith  1993 ). Social mobilisa-
tion in census politics has at times been successful (i.e., the Irish in 2001), at other 
times has consistently failed (i.e., the Cornish) and has not followed comparative 
patterns found elsewhere, as demonstrated by the differences between bureaucracy- led 
decision to enumerate mixed-race in Britain and the lobby-led call for a multiracial 
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category in the 2000 US census. However, the state is far from a unitary actor (Hall 
and Ikenberry  1990 ); census politics in Great Britain illustrate well that different 
arms of the state have different interests and policy outcomes are often the result of 
internal political battles. These confl icting interests of the state are particularly rel-
evant within the census policy network, since the state has a monopoly on setting 
the rules of the debate and the players permitted at the table. Census data are, fi rst 
and foremost, a product designed for government use in creating policies and pro-
gramming (Statistics Canada and United States Bureau of the Census  1993 ). The 
state decides what outside groups are consulted; it also decides the timing and pur-
pose of the consultations, which matter a great deal for policy outcomes. Are out-
side groups consulted before the decision-makers have made up their minds? What 
is the purpose of consultations with ethnic minority groups: for publicity, to gain 
approval, to ensure the question is acceptable, or to gather substantive input into the 
policy- making process? Recall that the timing and intent of consultations were criti-
cal to the failure of Haringey; though given the importance of public acceptability it 
is rather surprising that the government did not consult the racial minorities it 
intended to enumerate at an earlier stage. 54 
 Institutions alone cannot explain the dynamics of census politics in Britain. In 
fact, historical institutionalism emphasises that policy change is always rather 
 unlikely ; policy legacies and path dependent processes reproduce and magnify 
power distributions in politics, thus limiting opportunities for policy innovation and 
advantaging the status quo (Pierson  2000 ). The fact that the British state has sought 
to improve and amend the ethnic question every decade since its introduction speaks 
to the more ideational elements involved in the determination of racial categorisa-
tions. Ideas about multiculturalism, citizenship and belonging in the British context 
have played an incredible role in both preventing and supporting the ethnic ques-
tion. Britain initially experienced a national discomfort with the concept of race. In 
the late 1970s this anxiety was so great that when minorities requested a category 
synonymous to ‘Black British’ the government found the label unacceptable because 
it placed too much emphasis on differences of race and/or colour. This unease with 
the concept of race is not an indication of its non-existence, but rather its omnipres-
ence. In Britain, discourses of race and nation are articulated with the same breath, 
meaning that ‘statements about nationality are invariably also statements about 
54  The Home Affairs Committee’s 1982 Report was particularly scathing, arguing that Haringey 
was ‘a fl op’ because ‘in its form of questions and presentation to the public the Test asked or did 
everything our inquiry has suggested should not be asked or done, and because in its presentation 
little was done to provide assurances on confi dentiality and the value of questions to ethnic minor-
ity groups themselves’ (HM Government  1983 : vi–vii). The Report condemns the OPCS for the 
lack of publicity before and during the test, noting that the few public meetings that were held prior 
to the census rehearsal were poorly attended. It also recommends that OPCS establish an institu-
tionalised consultation process with ethnic minorities based on the model provided by the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s advisory committees, but in its reply the government noted its ‘reservations’ 
about setting up such a structure because of the costs involved (HM Government  1984 ). 
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“race”’ (Gilroy  1987 : 57). History dictates that Black and Asian people have been 
‘described, discussed and legislated for on the basis that they were a “problem” for 
the nation, not an intrinsic part of nor an asset to it. Their presence has been deemed 
to be temporary and conditional’ (Alibhai-Brown  1999 : 3). Attempts to promote 
racial equality have often perceived as threatening to national unity; however, in 
recent years British identity has sought to incorporate and promote multicultural 
principles as a source of national pride, though the balance between nationalism, 
citizenship and race remains somewhat tenuous (Gilroy  1987 ; Alibhai-Brown  2000 ; 
Neal  2003 ; Small and Solomos  2006 ; Worley  2005 ; Pilkington  2008 ). 
 The 2011 census demonstrated that Britain remains on its current dual trajec-
tory of counting in the name of multiculturalism and counting to positive action. 
However, the issues of the nature of race and conceptions of citizenship and 
belonging are far from settled. They are instead pulled in different directions 
because of new political developments, such as the UK’s membership in the 
European Union and its implications for immigration controls, Scottish and Welsh 
devolution, and new paradigms of race relations concerned with the threat of 
‘home-grown terror’ and the integration of Muslim populations. The 2011 UK cen-
suses featured a new question on national identity, which preceded the question on 
ethnicity. Respondents will be able to choose from six options: English, Welsh, 
Scottish, Northern Irish, British, or Other with a write-in space. This new question 
is not a response to the demands for a means of allowing racial minorities to iden-
tify themselves without feeling as though such an identifi cation would detract from 
their sense of belonging in the national community (i.e., Black British or Asian 
British), but rather is a by-product of processes of devolution in the UK, a growing 
sense of national identity in Scotland and Wales, the thrust to keep British national-
ism intact through policies emphasising ‘community cohesion,’ and a domestic 
concern about increasing immigration from Eastern European countries of the 
EU. Whether this resurgence of nationalism in Britain is a cause or effect of devo-
lution remains to be seen; nevertheless, the consequences for the census are real. It 
is also worthy of noting that while a multiple response approach was determined to 
be ‘too complicated’ to illicit proper responses to the ethnic question, the question 
on nationality on the 2011 census asked ‘How would you describe your national 
identity?’ and instructed respondents to ‘tick all that apply’ (ONS  2009 ). Once 
again, the census proves itself to be a fundamentally political entity situated within 
broader domestic and international policy debates concerning the nature of race, 
citizenship and belonging. 
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